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In mid-April 2020 Verfassungsblog published my first take on Finland’s response
to COVID-19, under the characterisation ‘Best Practice and Problems’. Into
February 2021, Finland has remained one of the few European champions in
combating the epidemic, with 9,423 cases and 131 deaths (both per one million
inhabitants and by 18 February 2021). Notably, Finland’s success has not followed
from strict ‘draconian’ measures but from a combination of factors that include at
least geographical location; cultural patterns that support physical distancing and
even isolation; a well-functioning healthcare system; a good level of compliance;
comparatively good levels of vitamin D; and sheer luck which would be related to the
first factor, geographical location.
Throughout 2020, the left-centre-green coalition government of Sanna Marin (Social
Democrats) was in charge, and COVID-19 was the number one issue of politics and
governance. The Cabinet met frequently in formal and informal sessions to discuss
the country’s strategy and decide on new piecemeal measures. For instance, border
controls where almost permanently on its agenda with frequent adjustments in one
or the other direction. A state of emergency was in place for three months (from mid-
March to mid-June) but the prospect of reinstituting it was communicated throughout
the year. Finland adopted neither a clear strategy to suppress the epidemic nor
a strategy of letting the virus wash through the younger and healthier segments.
Even officially, Finland declared itself to follow a ‘hybrid strategy’ which entails
emphasis on testing, tracing, (primarily voluntary) quarantine, working from home
when possible, income support to people in quarantine, reduction of all travel across
international borders, and limitations on public gatherings. In comparative terms,
measures related to masks, restaurants, public transport and ‘non-public’ (such as
religious) gatherings remained very relaxed. With a hybrid strategy and the constant
compromising it entails, the epidemic could have turned much worse. But it didn’t, so
far.
The central government’s response can be described as more communicative
than regulatory: With an early declaration of a state of emergency and a rapid
return to the state of normalcy, and with strong emphasis on recommendations, the
population was made conscious of the severity of the threat but by and large, legally
speaking, left at liberty as to their modes of everyday conduct.
On 26 January 2021 the Cabinet updated its national strategy against COVID-19 in a
situation of a new surge of cases in Europe, entailing the spread of more contagious
virus variants. Instead of moving to quick and decisive action, as recommended
by many experts including this author as well as the President of the Republic, the
Cabinet chose to follow the advice by a modeling group of the Finnish Institute for
Health and Welfare. The updated hybrid strategy entails close monitoring of the
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situation, proactive communication, and fine-tuning of existing restrictions but also
postponing more severe restrictions such as a lockdown. This choice was based
on an assessment that the health care system will be able to cope with the growing
epidemic until the end of March, despite the already recorded presence of more
contagious variants. To many a civil society commentator, including this author,
postponing stronger measures may be a strategic error and will require revisiting.
The Executive and Use of Powers in Response to
Emergency
Finland is a unitary State with relatively autonomous municipalities and a more
far-reaching regional autonomy of the Åland Islands with its own legislature. The
mainland territory of the country is allotted into the jurisdiction of six Regional State
Administrative Agencies which are organs of the central government. Due to a
political compromise the law is unclear as to whether they are mere administrative
arms of the Cabinet or closer to semi-autonomous Agencies that belong to the
State administration but are not under the direct command and control of Cabinet
Ministers. For instance, the Finnish Institute for Health and Welfare is one such
Agency.
Measures against COVID-19 primarily have been dealt with by the Cabinet, including
in respect of the triggering of the Emergency Powers Act, recommendations to the
public, and the frequently amended regime at the country’s territorial borders. The
three most prominent Ministries have been the Prime Minister’s Office, the Ministry
for Social Affairs and Health, and the Ministry of the Interior.
Section 80 of the Constitution entails a strict requirement that matters that affect the
rights and duties of individuals must be regulated through an Act of Parliament which
only to a limited degree can delegate legislative power to the Executive. Chapter II of
the Constitution, on fundamental rights, imposes strict requirements that restrictions
must be enacted in the form of an Act of Parliament. Also during COVID-19, any
amendments to existing Acts of Parliament have required the application of the full
legislative procedure. In contrast, the Emergency Powers Act does shift legislative
power into the hands of the Cabinet. That said, it is an important feature of the
regime for emergencies, as set forth in Section 23 of the Constitution and in the
Emergency Powers Act that there is real-time constitutional and parliamentary
scrutiny of any emergency regulations issued. As a consequence, major dimensions
of Finland’s responses to COVCID-19 have all the time been decided by Parliament
where the Constitutional Law Committee exercises continuous scrutiny over the
constitutionality and human-rights-conformity both of legislative Bills and of Cabinet
regulations issued under the Emergency Powers Act. This Committee, in turn,
regularly hears constitutional law experts and is surrounded by a public debate.
While the Emergency Powers Act had prime place in March-June 2020, later on
the legislative response has mainly focused on piecemeal amendments to the
Communicable Diseases Act. Restrictions of international travel were, however,
handled through Cabinet decisions and recommendations. On 19 February
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2021, a Bill was finally submitted to Parliament concerning compulsory testing
and associated measures, including when entering the country, as yet another
amendment to the Communicable Diseases Act.
The Effectiveness of Judicial and Legislative
Scrutiny and Oversight
Courts have generally adapted themselves to the situation by modifying their
methods of work. The epidemic has resulted in delays in court proceedings but
not as severely as in many other countries. Administrative courts have gradually
started to decide cases directly related to COVID-19 such as restrictions imposed by
institutions of care.
The two main institutions for oversight of legality, the Chancellor of Justice (of the
Cabinet) and the (Parliamentary) Ombudsman have received a large number of
complaints related to responses to COVID-19. Both appear to have adopted a
fairly soft approach of pointing out shortcomings and even mistakes but not finding
illegality or instituting criminal prosecution which would be within their powers. In
the issue of measures at Finland’s territorial borders, both oversight institutions
have criticised the Cabinet and the Border Control Agency for ambiguous drafting
of and misleading communication on decisions that have the appearance of legally
binding regulations but that in closer analysis have been recommendations,. These
decisions can be read so as to reflect acceptance or at least toleration of extra-
constitutional emergency powers, which would be very atypical for Finland.
Federal, Regional and Local Response and
Coordination
While the response primarily has been in the hands of the central Government, and
in particular the Cabinet, the Communicable Diseases Act creates an important
exception as it primarily is based on a decentralised model where the role of
Regional State Administrative Authorities, municipalities and individual specialist
doctors is significant. Issues such as mandatory health screening, mandatory
quarantine, contagion tracing, physical closing of educational institutions, and
banning or restricting public assemblies all primarily pertain to the parallel jurisdiction
of the respective municipality and Regional State Administrative Authority. As the
latter nevertheless are authorities of the State, they have closely coordinated their
actions and also been receptive to instructions from the Cabinet. Notably, in August
2020 the Regional State Administrative Authorities however demonstrated a degree
of autonomy in relation to contradictory instructions from the Ministry of Social Affairs
and Health concerning restrictions upon public assemblies.
Due to the central role of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health in the national
response and the decentralised model of the Communicable Diseases Act, one
recurring theme in legislative responses considered has been efforts to make the
powers and role of the said Ministry more prominent in the application of the Act.
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Notably, in February 2021 Parliament, following an Opinion by its Committee on
Constitutional Law, rejected an important amendment of the Act that would have
brought into its scope powers to restructure and reorganise the provision of health
and social services, powers that otherwise would only be available pursuant to the
Emergency Powers Act but were now proposed to be exercised by the Ministry of
Social Affairs and Health without the parliamentary scrutiny that would apply if the
Emergency Powers Act was triggered. Had the Bill been adopted, it would have
represented function creep through the insertion of delegated emergency powers
into ordinary legislation, undoing the safeguards related to the actual use of the
Emergency Powers Act. As said, the effort failed.
Human Rights Considerations
The Constitution has a comprehensive catalogue of fundamental rights, including
a comprehensive clause (Section 22) on positive obligations in respect of both
constitutional rights and international human rights. A pluralist system of scrutiny
entails that fundamental rights scrutiny is built into drafting of Bills, parliamentary
proceedings and the application of legislation or regulations. There is also a lively
public debate on any legal reform with human rights implications.
During COVID-19 and the year 2020, rights protections worked relatively well.
Examples of strict upholding of the standards include the right to privacy (the
COVID-19 app) and freedom of religion (exclusion of religious gatherings from the
scope of restrictions upon assemblies). Confusion and failures to respect human
rights did, however, result from ambiguously worded recommendations, including
visiting rights at institutions of care. No proper legal basis was found or created for
restrictions on cross-border movement which therefore have remained dubious.
Finland’s choice of a ‘hybrid strategy’ has translated into reluctance to impose
certain restrictions widely in use elsewhere. Wearing of face masks has been dealt
with merely in the form of recommendations that have lacked consistency and
produced relatively low compliance. Restaurants were subjected to restrictions
through an amendment of the law but in substance those restrictions, mildly reducing
maximum occupancy, are very relaxed compared to other countries. These and
some other cases of refraining from quick and rapid action may be criticized as
failures to meet the country’s positive human rights obligations under the right to
health and the right to life. As a consequence, the safe conducting of local elections
scheduled for 18 April 2021 may be confronted with unforeseen challenges.
2021 Outlook: Recommendations for Governance,
Democracy, Human Rights, and the Rule of Law
The trajectory of the epidemic in 2021 will be a race between vaccinations and new
virus strands. Finland’s communication-centred hybrid strategy may suddenly be
faced with an exponential rise of cases. If that were to happen, the Emergency
Powers Act would not be fit for purpose as its usefulness proved quite limited in
March-June 2020. A more adequate response could be based on the emergency
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powers provision in Section 23 of the Constitution, for the quick enactment of tailor-
made COVID-19 emergency measures, including derogations from freedom of
movement and other human rights and also triggering notifications concerning
derogations from the ECHR and ICCPR.
If this were to happen, the positive features of Finland’s approach to emergency
powers could still be preserved: immediate parliamentary scrutiny of any use of
emergency powers, including by hearing independent constitutional law experts
by the Constitutional Law Committee of Parliament, vigilance by legality oversight
authorities, and continued commitment to the restoration of normalcy as a lodestar
for any use of emergency powers.
If, however, the more virulent strands do not become a significant problem and
the race is won by vaccinating the population, attention should immediately shift
to a careful comprehensive review of both the Emergency Powers Act and the
Communicable Diseases Act. These two legal instruments have been central in
Finland’s handling of the epidemic, but they also have both proven to be highly
inadequate when the country is faced with an airborne pathogen that has a relatively
high reproductive number and relatively high fatality rates. COVID-19 will not be the
last pandemic with these parameters.
As Finland has been one of the EU countries that have de facto restricted intra-
EU travel, it would be well placed to take the initiative towards creating a proper
legal basis for the partitioning of the EU area during a public health emergency. It is
absurd that while Member States may be imposing lockdowns internally, including
by cordoning off parts of their territory, cross-border movement cannot be controlled
through evidence-based decision-making but is outside everyone’s competence
because of what ultimately is an ideological commitment to the four economic
freedoms of European integration. If the EU was a federal State hit by a deadly
pandemic, then evidence and reason, rather than ideology and impotence, would
govern its approach to freedom of movement.
Finally, governments, academics and international organisations should join forces
in conducting a human rights assessment of strategies against COVID-19. Doing
so would better equip the world for future pandemics, as human rights assessment
could be built into all plans for preparedness and prevention.
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